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COMPULSORY UNION MEMBERSHIP UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-IS HERSHEY
FOODS CORP. THE END OF THE ROAD?
Although the National Labor Relations Act' sanctions some form
of compulsory union membership,2 discharge of employees for non-
membership is tempered by two provisos. One proviso' is § 8(b) (3) (B)
which forbids discrimination against a nonmember employee if mem-
bership was denied or terminated for reasons other than nonpayment
of the initiation fee and periodic dues.4 However, reference in the Act
to union membership as a condition of employment has led to in-
creased controversy concerning the breadth of valid union security
provisions.' The National Labor Relations Board and the courts have
been confronted with the problem of whether Congress intended to
sanction some form of compulsory active' union membership or
1 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970).
2 Section 8(a)(3) of the Act contains the following provision:
Provided, That nothing in this subchapter. . . shall preclude an em-
ployer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to
require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after
the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the
effective date of such agreement ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
3 The other proviso requires that membership in the union be available to all
employees on nondiscriminatory terms and conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(A)
(1970).
Section 8(a)(3)(B) provides:
[t]hat no employer shall justify any discrimination against an em-
ployee for nonmembership in a labor organization . . . (B) if he has
reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or ter-
minated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender
the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condi-
tion of acquiring or retaining membership.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(B) (1970). Discrimination in this context refers to situations in
which an employer extends more favorable work conditions or wages to employees on
the basis of union membership. Additionally, it would include the discharge of an
employee for reasons related to union membership.
5 See text accompanying notes 108-11 infra. See, e.g., NLRB v. Technicolor Mo-
tion Picture Corp., 248 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1957); NLRB v. Pape Broadcasting Co., 217
F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Philadelphia Iron Works, 211 F.2d 937 (3d Cir.
1954).
£ The Court dealt with the concept of active membership in NLRB v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). In that case, the Court stated that an active
member was one who pledges allegiance to the union constitution, takes an oath of full
union membership, attends union meetings, and generally enjoys full union member-
ship. Id. at 196.
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merely financial support of the union.' In NLRB v. Hershey Foods
Corp.,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld an employee's right to refrain from joining a labor union. The
court enforced the National Labor Relations Board decision' that if
an employee is willing to tender payments equal to union fees and
dues, then the employee cannot be compelled to become a member"0
of the union."
In Hershey an employee resigned from union membership to re-
turn to work during a strike. The collective bargaining contract in
effect before the strike contained a security agreement requiring em-
ployees to be members in good standing.2 The union and company
failed to reach a new agreement when the existing contract expired
and the union went on strike. The employee returned to work after
sending a letter of resignation to the union. After the strike ended
with a new contract containing a union security agreement, the em-
ployee forwarded a check to the union for an amount equal to mem-
bership dues. The union, however, refused the tender and requested
that the employee rescind his resignation and direct that the amount
be credited to dues. 3 When he failed to comply with its request, the
union demanded the employee's discharge. After submitting the mat-
ter to arbitration, the company complied with the union's demand. 4
The employee subsequently filed unfair labor practice charges
against both the union and the company. The NLRB ordered his
reinstatement, 5 holding that the Act allows agreements only to the
See text accompanying notes 108-11 infra.
513 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975).
Hershey Foods Corp., 207 N.L.R.B. 897 (1973), enforced, NLRB v. Hershey
Foods Corp., 513 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975).
"o When the Ninth Circuit stated that an employee could not be compelled to
become a union member, it meant a member to the extent that he would be subject
to more than the financial obligations of membership. 513 F.2d at 1085. See text
accompanying notes 45-48 infra.
" 207 N.L.R.B. 897 (1973).
'2 Id. at 899. The union security agreement defined member in good standing as
one who tendered the required fees and dues. In a letter to the union, the employee
stated that he was resigning his membership but would tender an amount equal to dues
if membership was required under the new labor agreement. The union admitted that
there were no union rules that would affect the validity of the employees resignation.
Id. at 899-900.
"1 The collective agreement allowed employees who could not join the union for
legitimate religious reasons to pay merely a service charge equal to union fees and dues.
This was the only situation, however, in which the agreement sanctioned nonmember-




extent that they require payment of initiation fees and periodic dues.
An employee, the Board stated, who meets this financial obligation
cannot be discharged.'6
The Hershey decision is the first definitive holding since the pas-
sage of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)'
7
regarding the extent to which a valid security agreement can control
an employee in the exercise of his employment rights.'8 The main
issue which the Board and the Ninth Circuit confronted in Hershey
was whether an employee may refrain from joining the union and
fulfill his obligations under a valid agreement by merely tendering an
amount equal to required dues. 9 Although the issue of the union's
power to discipline bargaining unit employees was not directly ad-
dressed, it was an implicit concern."0 The decision's impact, however,
may transcend its effects on the rights of the individual workers in-
volved.' Since the ramifications of the Hershey decision involve the
growth of individual employees' rights and union stability,22 the ulti-
mate evaluation of the decision requires a balancing of the potential
gains in the area of individual rights against the potential harm to
union stability and bargaining strength.?
The adverse climate which nurtured the early labor movement
and produced the union security agreement formed an important
background to the Hershey decision. During the first part of the
Twentieth Century, unions were not an accepted part of the Ameri-
can society.24 As the labor movement grew it encountered determined
Is Id.
17 Labor Management Relations Act, Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(1947).
," Employment rights include the right to continued employment, to contract with
the employer, and to the benefits of the collective contract. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB,
321 U.S. 332 (1944).
" Haggard, A Clarification of the Types of Union Security Agreements Affirma-
tively Permitted by Federal Statutes, 5 RUTGERS CAMDEN L. REv. 418, 434-35 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Haggard].
0 See text accompanying notes 45-55, 119 & 120 infra.
21 See text accompanying notes 113-17 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 115-17 infra.
1 See text accompanying notes 119-21 infra.
'A The idea of organized labor and collective bargaining was contrary to the Ameri-
can idea of individualism. The Puritan work ethic, which was firmly imbued in our
society, stressed the benefits of hard work in order to get ahead in the labor market.
Social Darwinism, a predominant social theory of the early Twentieth Century, was
based on the belief that a person's success or failure in employment was a result of
individual motivation and ability. See generally C. BUFFORD, THE WAGNER AcT: EM-
PLOYEE AND EMPLOYER RELATIONS, (1st ed. 1941); NEW YORK STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE
1976]
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opposition from hostile employers." To facilitate growth, unions
sought means of increasing their bargaining power by building larger
and more cohesive memberships. The security agreement met the
needs of the union by compelling membership.26
Four types of security agreements developed. Under the first, an
open shop agreement, unions were recognized but employees had the
unrestrained option to join, or refuse to join, the union.21 In contrapo-
sition was the closed shop. In order to be considered for employment
a worker had to be a union member and, generally, employers re-
quested workers through union hiring halls.28 The union shop, the
type of agreement involved in Hershey, was less restrictive. Under a
union shop agreement, workers were not required to be union mem-
bers in order to be hired, but they were compelled to become mem-
bers within a specified period of time after being hired and to remain
members as long as employed. 9 Finally, the agency shop permitted
the union to require the financial support of all employees but actual
union membership was optional. An employee who chose not to be-
come a member was still required to pay a service charge to the union.
This charge was usually equal to initiation fees and periodic dues
required of members."
COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR CONDITIONS, THE AMERICAN STORY OF INDUSTRIAL
AND LABOR RELATIONS 36-58 (1943) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. STATE LEG. CoMm.].
The two popular methods used by employers to hinder labor organization were
the blacklisting of known or suspected union sympathizers and the "yellow dog" con-
tract. Employers circulated lists of union sympathizers who they felt were undesirable
employees and appearance on this "blacklist" made it virtually impossible for union
sympathizers to find employment. The "yellow dog" contract was often forced on
employees as the result of the superior bargaining strength of the employer. These
contracts forbade union membership. Early legislation outlawing "yellow dog" con-
tracts was declared unconstitutional. E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (state
legislation); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (federal legislation pertaining
to the railroads). However, by 1930 new laws were surviving constitutional challenges.
N.Y. STATE LEG. COMM. at 101-5.
25 See generally C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 115-20 (2d rev. ed. with supp.
1961).
2 See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 269 n.2, 270 (1917)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 Id. The closed shop and hiring hall are allowed, in modified form, in the build-
ing and construction industries. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1970). When a hiring hall is used,
prospective employees seek employment through a union rather than through direct
contact with the employer. See generally L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR
RELATIONS 510 (6th ed. 1974).
" Haggard, supra note 19, at 419. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA purportedly adopts
the idea of the union shop, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), however, Hershey holds that less
than a true union shop is actually allowed. See text accompanying notes 105-10 infra.
-0 Haggard, supra note 19, at 419.
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Congress, in passing the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act), recognized the need for legislative sanction of security agree-
ments. 1 Congress provided for the workers' right to organize in § 7
which permits concerted activities, free from employer interference,
to obtain better contract terms.2 To further strengthen the develop-
ment of unionism, the Wagner Act also gave legislative approval to
the closed shop3 and other forms of union security. 4 Free from em-
ployer harassment and through the use of security agreements, un-
ions vastly increased membership and expanded their power.
3
1
Abuse accompanied the growth of union power. Union leaders
called an excessive number of strikes and work slowdowns, many
leading to violence and property damage.36 The closed and union
shops were also misused. Many workers could not obtain employment
31 H. MILLis & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACr To TAFr-HARTLEY, 27-29 (5th ed.
1965) [hereinafter cited as MiLLs & BROWN]. Although large segments of American
society acknowledged the validity of labor unions, employer opposition continued to
hamper union efforts to organize workers. The Depression aggravated the industrial
injustices, which in turn disturbed industry. The stock market collapse and Depression
destroyed the worker's faith in welfare capitalism and increased middle class sympa-
thies toward organized labor. Keynesian economics, the foundation of New Deal poli-
cies, emphasized the importance of increasing mass purchasing power. Increased labor
bargaining power, achieved by aiding labor to organize, was one way to stop shrinking
payrolls and increase mass purchasing power necessary to sustain a mass producing
economy. By enabling workers, through unions, to bargain with employers on an equal
basis unions were able to raise wage levels and lower working hours. This not only gave
workers more money to spend which aided the faltering economy, but also created jobs
for the unemployed. The NLRA was one by-product of the massive legislative effort
to end the Depression. Protection of unionism provided by the Act was a desirable
counterbalance to previously unrestrained power of large industries. Id. at 19-29.
2 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Section 8(a)(5) of the Act requires employers to bargain
collectively with representative unions concerning wages, hours, and similar conditions
of employment. Id. § 158(a)(5). These provisions were made effective by § 8(1) which
made interference with employees' § 7 rights an unfair labor practice.
m Section 8(3) of the Wagner Act gave approval to closed shop provisions in
collective contracts as long as the union was not established or assisted by unfair labor
practices and was the authorized representative as provided by § 9(a). See, e.g., Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge No. 35 v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940); Peninsular
& Occidental S. S. Co. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 411 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 563
(1938). See also S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
Unions were able to add twelve million members to their rolls between the
passage of the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act. MiLius & BROWN, supra note 31,
at 271.
3 As large unions such as the Teamsters, Steelworkers, and Mine Workers devel-
oped they were able to use their large memberships and financial resources to conduct
widespread strikes which paralyzed large sections of the economy. Id. at 272.
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because unions refused to accept them as members and in instances
where union membership was open, new members were charged exor-
bitant fees and dues. Also, a worker who joined a union was not
guaranteed future employment since his membership could be capri-
ciously terminated, thus resulting in the loss of employment." Such
increases in union strength were feared as a threat to the social sys-
tem."
The Taft-Hartley Act39 was adopted to curb the excesses of union
power. Restrictions abolishing the closed shop" were placed on union
security agreements,4' but § 8(a)(3) was added to permit agreements
that require employees to become "union members" within thirty
days after initial employment.2 That section further provides, how-
ever, that an employer cannot discharge an employee for nonmem-
bership if membership was denied or terminated for reasons other
than nonpayment of initiation fees and periodic dues.43 This statutory
combination represents a congressional desire to shield an employee's
employment rights from his organization duties while preventing him
from enjoying the benefit of union representation without bearing
some burden to support the union. 4
The ambiguous language in § 8(a)(3) has necessitated judicial
interpretation of the degree of union control over bargaining unit
employees that Congress intended to sanction. The Hershey decision
resolves several of the questions raised by previous decisions which
confronted the problem of union discipline of employees. Among
those decisions was NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.
which upheld court-enforceable union discipline. 5 The Supreme
Id. at 277-78.
Id. at 22-30.
' Labor Management Relations Act, Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(1947).
o See note 28 supra.
, See notes 2-4 supra.
4' Only the union which is the authorized representative of the employees may
bargain with an employer concerning union security agreements. 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3)(i) (1970).
4 See note 4 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 98-101 infra.
43 388 U.S. 175 (1967). The union member crossed union picket lines to return to
work in violation of the union's resolution calling for a fine against strikebreakers. The
employee was fined after completion of a union disciplinary hearing. When he refused
to pay the fine the union sought enforcement in the courts. See generally Archer, Allis-
Chalmers Recycled: A Current View of a Union's Right to Fine Employees for Crossing
a Picket Line, 7 IND. L. REv. 498 (1974); Note, Union Power to Discipline Members
Who Resign, 86 HAnv. L. REV. 1536 (1973); 42 U. CINN. L. REv. 146 (1973).
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Court stated that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments indicated congressional reluctance to interfere in union inter-
nal affairs.46 The Court held that a union could fine full union mem-
bers47 for violations of union rules and could enforce the fines either
judicially or through expulsion from the union. 8
Although a union could justifiably discipline a full member for
violations of union rules, it was uncertain whether this power ex-
tended to members after resignation from the union. The Court ex-
amined this question in NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1229.11 In
Textile Workers, several union members attempted to avoid fines for
strikebreaking by resigning before returning to work, but the union
fined the strikebreakers despite their resignations." The employees
filed unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB which ruled5' that
the union's action violated § 8(b)(1) of the Act which forbids union
interference with employees' § 7 rights to refrain from engaging in
concerted activities.52 On appeal from the Court of Appeals' denial of
enforcement,53 the Supreme Court held that a union's power over its
members ceased upon termination of membership and, therefore, the
union could not fine strikebreakers who had resigned. 4 The holding
in Textile Workers, however, is limited in scope since no union rule
restricted the ability of a member to resign, and the collective bar-
gaining agreement requiring union membership had lapsed. Although
the employees were able to resign and avoid union discipline, the
Court did not consider the extent to which the ability to resign can
be circumscribed by a contract between the member and the union
or by a valid security agreement.
55
Congressional intent to insulate an employee's employment rights
from his organizational duties56 provokes serious questions concerning
union restrictions on a member's ability to resign. Textile Workers
left open the possibility that a union security agreement requiring
" 388 U.S. at 185.
'7 See note 6 supra.
" 388 U.S. at 192.
" 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
5' A resolution calling for a fine of $2000 for strikebreaking had been adopted by
the members before the employees involved had resigned. Id. at 214.
11 Textile Workers Local 1029, 187 N.L.R.B. 636 (1970).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1970).
NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, 446 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).
409 U.S. at 217.
Id. See generally Note, Union Power to Discipline Members Who Resign, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1536 (1973); 42 U. CINN. L. REv. 146 (1973).
-" See text accompanying notes 96-99 infra.
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membership might subject an employee who resigns to a risk of dis-
charge from employment. In order to avoid contravention of the
congressional intent to protect employee employment rights, how-
ever, it has also been stated that union membership must be volun-
tary to permit a union to discipline its members.57 The NLRB, in
Hershey, utilized the same rationale in deciding that a valid agree-
ment cannot, in fact, require actual membership in a union as a
condition of employment. The Board eliminated existing ambiguity
by defining membership, under the Act, as requiring only the pay-
ment of a sum equal to union dues. 8
On the basis of the facts 9 in Hershey, the Board found, with one
member dissenting,"° that the union and company had been guilty of
unfair labor practices in discharging the employee. According to the
Board, a valid security agreement could only require payment of an
initiation fee and periodic dues." The employee, therefore, was under
no obligation to become, or remain, a union member."
In reaching its decision, the Board emphasized its reasoning in
Union Starch and Refining Co. 3 In Union Starch the Board held that
if obtaining union membership required more than payment of dues
an employee could not be discharged from employment for nonmem-
bership. 4 The union in Hershey attempted to distinguish the Union
Starch decision in that the union had imposed no condition on mem-
bership beyond the payment of dues, while in Union Starch the union
required new members to take a union oath and attend a meeting at
which their application for membership would be approved. How-
ever, the Board stated that this had no bearing on the case. 5 The
union argued that if it were willing to extend membership to an
See Haggard, supra note 19, at 442-43.
Hershey Foods Corp., 207 N.L.R.B. 897 (1973).
5g See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
o See note 65 infra.
207 N.L.R.B. 897.
62 Id.
87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
815 (1951). See also cases cited in 513 F.2d at 1086.
,4 87 N.L.R.B. 779, 784.
11 207 N.L.R.B. at 901. But see Board Chairman Miller's dissenting opinion. Id.
at 897. Chairman Miller urged that the § 8(a)(3) proviso forbids an employer to dis-
charge an employee for nonmembership in the union if he has reason to believe that
"membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than failure of the employee
to tender. . . periodic dues and . . . initiation fees . . . ... The employee, Chairman
Miller reasoned, did not fall within the protection of the proviso because membership
was not denied him. The employee, admittedly, did not seek or desire to become a
member. Id. at 898.
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employee solely on the condition that he pay dues, the employee
could be carried on the union membership rolls." The Board noted,
however, that despite language to the contrary, the Supreme Court
had concluded that Congress intended to prevent the use of security
agreements for any purpose other than compelling the payment of
dues. 7
According to the Board in Hershey, although the union may list
an employee on its membership rolls if he pays dues, the union can-
not require any affirmative action" by the employee. Moreover, a
unilaterally enrolled employee69 is not subject to all obligations of
membership." The Board indicated that a true union membership
relationship is a voluntary contractual relationship which the em-
ployee can terminate at will.' Membership under the Act, the Board
reasoned, means no more than a duty to pay fees and dues uniformly
required of members when membership is not voluntarily sought by
an employee.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
viewed the Board's order.7 3 In enforcing the order, the court indicated
that the form of union security agreement allowed by § 8(a)(3)74 was
a compromise between disallowing all compulsory unionism and
maintaining the legality of the closed shop. 71 Judge Wallace, for the
" 207 N.L.R.B. at 901. The union relied on Supreme Court dictum:
[I]f the union chooses to extend membership even though the em-
ployee will meet only the minimum financial burden, and refuses to
support or "join" the union in any other affirmative way, the em-
ployee may have to become a "member" under a-union shop contract,
in the sense that the union may be able to place him on its rolls.
NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1963) (footnote omitted). The
union felt that this language indicated that an employee could be compelled to join
the union if the only prerequisite to membership was payment of dues. The effect on
the employee of being carried on the union rolls, if he takes no active part in union
activities, is uncertain. The Court did not foreclose the possibility of extending union
discipline power to cover members who merely pay dues. See text accompanying notes
83-85 infra.
87 207 N.L.R.B. at 902. The Board relied upon NLRB v. General Motors Corp.,
373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963), citing Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954).
" By affirmative action the Board meant attending union meetings, taking oaths,
or, as was the case in Hershey, rescinding a previous resignation.
11 A unilaterally enrolled employee is one who was involuntarily placed on union
rolls as a result of his paying dues.
71 207 N.L.R.B. at 902.
71 Id.
7 Id. at 903.
n NLRB v. Hershey Foods Corp., 513 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975).
, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
n 513 F.2d at 1085.
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court, indicated that this compromise was designed to eliminate "free
riders" while proscribing the union's power to determine an em-
ployee's future on the job. 7  He reasoned that the union security
agreements might be described as "in the nature of union shops. 7 8
Although a union may prescribe rules for acquisition and retention
of membership, Judge Wallace stated that as long as an employee is
willing to pay dues and initiation fees he is protected from employ-
ment discharge by § 8(a)(3)(B) of the Act.
79
The membership requirements under the Act have a significant
impact on the union's power to discipline employees in the bargaining
unit. 0 The Supreme Court has held that a union can impose court-
enforceable fines on active members,8' but that a union cannot disci-
pline employees for action taken after they have resigned from the
union.8" The Court had not, however, dealt with the question of
whether a valid union security agreement can restrict a member's
right to'resign.
As stated previously, prior case law concerning the union's disci-
plinary power over its members was an important factor leading to
the Hershey decision. In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.
and subsequent cases dealing with union discipline of members, the
Supreme Court placed great emphasis on the voluntary nature of the
union-member relationship, but failed to examine the effect of a secu-
rity agreement on an employee's decision to become an active union
member.83 The Court also did not explain the degree to which a union
1' A "free rider" is an employee who benefits from the efforts of the union without
bearing his share of the burdens. Generally, the financial burdens of unionism are
emphasized, leading to efforts to force all employees to at least pay dues. When an
employee supports the union financially, but ignores the organizational duties of union
membership he can be considered an "organizational free rider." See text accompany-
ing notes 90-95 infra.
513 F.2d at 1085.
78 Id.; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA 321 (1948) [hereinafter cited as LEG.
HiST. OF LMRA]. See text accompanying notes 59-72 supra.
7' 513 F.2d at 1087.
0 See text accompanying notes 45-55 supra.
81 Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175 (1967).
"2 Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 412 U.S.
84 (1973); NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972). Both of these
cases involved attempts by the unions to enforce judicially fines on employees who had
resigned from the union. The employees involved had resigned from the unions because
they desired to return to work during union strikes. The Court held that a union could
not fine members for actions taken after they had resigned. 412 U.S. at 85; 409 U.S.
at 217-18.
- 388 U.S. 175, 196 (1967).
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can discipline a member who does no more than pay required fees and
dues. 4 If an agreement can compel an employee to submit to union
discipline, an employee's § 7 rights to engage or refrain from engaging
in concerted activities free from either management or union coercion
would appear to be violated.8 5 In two cases subsequent to Allis-
Chalmers the Court held that a union's power over a member termi-
nates when that member resigns from the union.8 However, the
Court expressly avoided determining whether the contractual rela-
tionship between members and the union or a valid security agree-
ment could limit a member's right to resign. Therefore, the possibil-
ity that an employee could be compelled to expose himself to union
discipline under a valid agreement was not foreclosed.
The Hershey decision settles several questions concerning union
discipline and control of its membership. With union membership
under the Act defined as simply the payment of dues and fees, the
assumption now is that those employees who actually join 8 the union
do so voluntarily. Thus, under Hershey, an employee who joins a
union can be assumed to be a full and active member thereby subject
to union discipline. 9 The Hershey decision is also partially disposi-
tive of the effect of a member's resignation on the union's power over
him. If, as the court in Hershey held, a valid security agreement can
require no more than payment of union dues, an employee cannot lose
his job upon resignation so long as he meets the financial obligations
m 388 U.S. 175 (1967). See Local 749, Boilermakers v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 343, 345
n.3 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973).
' 29 U.S.C.. § 157 (1970).
Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 412 U.S.
84 (1973); NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
11 Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 412 U.S.
84, 88 (1973); NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213, 217 (1972). The
NLRB considered one such restriction in UAW, Local 647, 197 N.L.R.B. 608 (1972).
In that decision the union claimed that the resignation was invalid due to a union
constitutional provision which allowed resignations ten days before the end of the fiscal
year only. The Board held that this provision so drastically limited the members right
to resign that it had to be ignored, because there was no connection between the
restriction and any legitimate union interests. Id. at 609. In an earlier case, NLRB v.
UAW, 320 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1963), the court upheld a similar provision. The court found
a legitimate union interest in insuring "'uniform practices to preserve its financial
standing by establishing reasonable times for resignations.'" Id. at 16. This case was
decided before Scofield and Allis-Chalmers which emphasized the voluntary nature of
the union-member relationship. See text accompanying notes 45-57 supra.
" An employee who actually joins the union is one who chooses active membership
rather than the Hershey option to pay merely an amount equal to dues.
" See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
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of union membership. Therefore, a security agreement cannot oper-
ate in such a way as to prevent an employee from resigning to avoid
union discipline. The court in Hershey did not define the degree to
which a member's resignation can be restricted by a union by-law or
constitutional provision. The decision could, however, aid the courts
in deciding the extent to which a union rule can restrict member
resignation. Actual union membership under Hershey is purely vol-
untary, and members of a voluntary association can be expected to
abide by all of he rules of that association, including reasonable
restrictions on the right to resign from the association.
Certain factors, however, militate in favor of increased union con-
trol over employees. One such factor arises from the benefits shared
by all employees, regardless of membership status, from a union ne-
gotiated contract.9" Another benefit to the employee is that employers
may not negotiate less advantageous individual contracts with em-
ployees who choose not to become union members.9 If all employees
benefit from the bargaining efforts of the union, all employees should
be required to accept certain responsibilities of union membership.92
o j. 1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). In J. . Case the company refused
to bargain collectively with the certified union claiming that the employment relation-
ship was controlled by individual contracts that had been negotiated with employees.
The NLRB held that the refusal to bargain with the union violated § 8(5) of the
Wagner Act, which makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain over any
matter for which bargaining was authorized, and indicated that the individual con-
tracts were being used to im'pede the employees' § 7 rights. Id. at 334. The Court
indicated that although individual employment contracts must be made with each
employee, all employees were entitled to all of the benefits of the collective agreement
even if willing to settle for less beneficial terms. Contracts made between employers
and individual employees concerning matters that are subject to collective bargaining
are superseded by the collective agreement. Id. at 338. See Medo Photo Supply Corp.
v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610 (1st Cir. 1963);
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210
F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954), af/'d, 348 U.S. 437 (1955); NLRB v. Port Gibson Veneer & Box
Co., 167 F.2d 144 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 819 (1948); Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox,
152 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1945).
J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944).
9' Not only do all employees benefit from the terms of the union negotiated collec-
tive agreement, but also the union has a duty to represent fairly all members of the
bargaining unit, regardless of their membership status. E.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335 (1964); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944). Cf. Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41 (1957). See generally Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV.
151 (1957). This duty of fair representation extends to representation during grievance
proceedings as well as during collective bargaining. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147
F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945). Unions argue that this duty to represent all employees in a
bargaining unit should carry with it a corresponding duty on the part of those employ-
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Although the Hershey decision emphasized the financial obligations
of union membership, the court neglected to examine an expanded
form of the "free rider" theory.93 The Hershey decision requires all
employees who benefit from the collective bargaining agreement to
carry the financial burden of the collective bargaining process. How-
ever, employees are allowed to avoid the organizational responsibili-
ties of union membership.94 The effect on union bargaining power of
freeing employees from all but the most basic financial obligations
toward the union is indeterminable. The possibility of seriously ham-
pering the unions in the execution of their bargaining function is,
however, a potentially serious ramification of the decision.
95
The dual purpose96 served by the language of the relevant Taft-
Hartley provisions obfuscates the nature of allowable union security
agreements.9" Section 8(a) (3) of the Act98 permits an agreement which
ees to support the union. CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE CASE AGAINST
"RIGHT TO WORK" LAWS 81-82 (1957).
93 See text accompanying note 76 supra.
11 Most important is the fact that nonmembers may continue working and earning
a living while union members are out on strike in order to persuade the employer to
grant benefits to all employees, union members and nonmembers alike.
11 If the Ninth Circuit had decided that an employee could be compelled to join
the union if the only prerequisite to membership was payment of dues and fees, courts
in the future could have operated within the interstices of the Allis-Chalmers decision.
That case left unanswered the question of whether a union could discipline members
who paid dues but took no active role in union activities. 388 U.S. 175, 197 (1967). If
it became necessary to avoid hampering the unions in their role as bargaining agents,
courts could allow unions to levy fines against these inactive members in circumstan-
ces where it might prove vital to the preservation of the union. An example of such a
situation would be during a union strike. By levying fines against strikebreakers, the
union would be able to force compliance by all bargaining unit members with the strike
vote without coming within the purview of the § 8(a)(3) provisions dealing with dis-
crimination against nonmember employees. Because these fines would be court-
enforceable the union would not have to resort to the threat of expulsion in order to
enforce them. See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra & 119-21 infra.
" See text accompanying note 99 infra.
'7 The legislators consistently indicated that union shops and compulsory mem-
bership were allowable thirty days after commencement of employment. On the other
hand, the debates also seemed to center around eliminating the "free rider," one who
seeks to benefit from the efforts of the union without offering his support. It is possible
that the rhetoric, and ultimately the language drafted, was vague because of the
politically volatile nature of the amendments. The Senate Committee Report stated
that, under the Act:
An employee is permitted to make arrangements requiring member-
ship in a union as a condition of employment applicable to employees
in a given bargaining unit thirty days after an employee is hired...
Under another proviso of this subsection, it becomes an unfair labor
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requires union membership as a condition of employment, but the
Hershey decision defines this "membership" as nothing more than
payment of a sum equal to fees and dues. The two major aims
throughout the debates over the Taft-Hartley amendments were to
separate an employee's employment rights from his organizational
duties and to prevent nonmembers from benefiting at the expense of
dues-paying members.9 9 Congress attempted to accomplish these
twin goals in § 8(a)(3) by authorizing security agreements requiring
membership, but permitting discharge from employment only for
failure to pay dues. Whether Congress intended § 8(a)(3) to be applic-
able only after an employee becomes a member' 0 or to allow an
employee to refrain from joining the union is uncertain.,
Prior to Hershey the NLRB and courts had interpreted the legisla-
tive history of the Act in favor of the former position. These cases
appear consistent with an interpretation of the Act sanctioning secu-
practice for an employer to discharge an employee under a
compulsory-membership clause if he has reasonable grounds for be-
lieving . . . (B) that membership in the union was terminated for
reasons other than nonpayment of regular dues and initiation fees...
The committee did not desire to limit the labor organization to either
its selection of membership or expulsion therefrom. But the commit-
tee did wish to protect the employee in his job if unreasonably ex-
pelled or denied membership.
LEG. HiST. OF LMRA, supra note 78, at 426. See id. at 300. Senator Taft, one of the
bill's sponsors, said:
[M]any persons believe that the union shop, which is the usual form
of closed shop, should be absolutely prohibited. The committee did
not feel that it should go that far, but the committee felt that if it
permitted a union shop agreement which provided that every man
must be a member of the union, then the union must be reasonable,
must accept as members all who apply for membership, and must
accept them on the same terms as it applies to other members, and
must permit them to remain in the union if they are willing to pay
their dues.
93 CONG. REC. 4193 (1947). See also id. at 5088. See generally Taft, The Taft-Hartley
Act, What It Does Do, What It Doesn't Do, 15 I.C.C. PRAc. J. 466 (1948).
" See note 2 supra.
" LEG. HisT. OF LMRA, supra note 78, at 413. See also Haggard, supra note 19,
at 439-40.
101 Prior cases have definitively held that membership in the union cannot be a
condition of employment if more than payment of dues is required of employees as a
prerequisite to membership. Consequently, § 8(a)(3) is clearly applicable if member-
ship is denied or terminated for reasons other than nonpayment of dues. The question
of when § 8(a)(3) applies is uncertain only in situations in which the union is willing
to accept an employee into its ranks if he does no more than pay dues.
101 See note 65 supra.
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rity agreements which require an employee to join the union, pro-
vided that the only prerequisite to union membership is payment of
dues and initiation fees. In NLRB v. General Motors Corp.,102 the
Court found a company's refusal to bargain over an agency shop
agreement a violation of the Act. In dictum the Court indicated that
the agency shop provision dealt with in that case was a less coercive
contract requiring less adherence to the union than the arrangement
sanctioned by the Act." 3 The Court discussed "membership" under
the Act, concluding that it was limited to its "financial core."',' Al-
though expulsion could result in discharge from employment only for
failure to pay dues, the Court indicated that, if the only prerequisite
to membership was the payment of dues, the union may carry all
employees on the membership rolls." 5 Arguably, the only allowable
security agreements fall between a union shop and an agency shop.0 ,
Although the discussion in General Motors on allowable agreements
under the Act was dictum, it is important to analysis of the Hershey
decision which defined allowable union security as no more than an
agency shop in contravention of the dictum in the General Motors
decision.'
Prior cases concerning union membership involved denial of
membership because the prospective member refused to comply with
requirements beyond the payment of dues.' In Hershey, however,
the employee could have become a member by merely paying union
dues and initiation fees. The Ninth Circuit stated that an employee's
desire to become a member is irrelevant to the application of §
1- 373 U.S. 734 (1963). See generally Toner, The Union Shop Under Taft-Hartley,
5 LAB. L.J. 552 (1954); Cogen, Is Joining the Union Required in the Taft-Hartley Union
Shop?, 5 LAB. L.J. 659 (1954).
"I General Motors concerned only an unfair labor practice charge that is not
relevant to the present discussion. Nevertheless, in dictum, the Court stated, "[flf
Congress desired. . - in the Taft-Hartley Act [to permit] the union shop, then it also
intended to preserve the status of less vigorous, less compulsory contracts which de-
manded less adherence to the union." 373 U.S. at 741.
' Id. at 742.
" See note 67 supra.
" Haggard, supra note 19, at 425-26; see text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
'0 The dictum in General Motors dealing with the relative nature of union and
agency shop agreements is of debatable importance. The Court's reasoning was not
dispositive of the question in the *case and, arguably, emphasis should not be placed
on isolated and unnecessary language in the opinion. The Court did not need to inter-
pret the language of § 8(a)(3) as it relates to its maximum allowances. Nevertheless,
the language is some indication of how the question was viewed by the Supreme Court.
I" See, e.g., NLRB v. Hershey Foods Corp., 513 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1975);
Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951).
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8(a)(3)(B) protecting him from discharge from employment., 9 The
Ninth Circuit went significantly beyond prior decisions concerning
compulsory union membership. Although prior cases held that a non-
voluntary member could not be forced to comply with membership
requirements such as signing of union applications, taking of union
oaths, or attending union meetings, there was some indication that
the employee could be compelled to join the union if only payment
of dues and fees were required."' Hershey is the first case deciding
that a union cannot compel an employee to join the union even if it
requires mere payment of dues. A valid security agreement can only
require payment of an amount equal to initiation fees and periodic
dues, the equivalent of an agency shop."'
Prior to Hershey the effect of a union security agreement on an
employee's employment rights and organizational duties was uncer-
tain. Although an employee could not be required to comply with any
conditions of membership beyond dues payment, he could be sub-
jected to reasonable union discipline if he were an active union mem-
ber. The Court had not decided whether an employee could be sub-
jected to union discipline if his membership consisted solely of dues
payments. Moreover, the ability of an employee to resign from the
union to avoid union rules without jeopardizing his job security was
questionable.1
2
Hershey resolves these uncertainties to some extent. Apparently
a valid agreement cannot compel an employee to join a union, even
if the only requirement is the payment of dues. The employee is
without any obligation to the union beyond providing financial sup-
port and, by declining union membership, is able to flaunt union
rules without risking discipline. If an employee joins the union, but
later decides not to abide by the rules, he may resign without fear of
losing his job. The decision that a union security agreement can
require no more of the employee than financial support of the union,
" 513 F.2d at 1087. See Local 749, Boilermakers v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 343, 344-45
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also note 64 supra.
Io The Board stated:
[T]he employees were willing to comply with the only term or condi-
tion for membership which we think can, under the provisos, legally
be enforced by discharge-the tender of the periodic dues and the
initiation fees uniformly required.
Union Starch & Refining Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779, 785 (1949) (emphasis in original).
" See text accompanying note 30 supra.
112 An employee's freedom to resign from the union to avoid discipline would be
of particular importance if he were not in sympathy with a strike and desired to return
to work.
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therefore, raises questions concerning the effects it will have on labor.
Although the Hershey decision promotes the rights of individual
workers, all workers in the bargaining unit are still, absent a provision
to the contrary, 1 3 bound by the collective bargaining agreement.'
Neither the Board nor the courts have confronted the issue of whether
a nonmember may individually negotiate a more beneficial con-
tract."- However, the union is under a duty to represent members and
nonmembers alike; the employer is under a concomitant duty to bar-
gain only with the bargaining representative."'
There are compelling reasons, in the labor field, for sacrificing
the right of individuals to contract."7 Hershey allows an individual
worker who contributes merely financially, to reap the benefits of the
union negotiated agreement, while bargaining higher individual ad-
vantages. This creates injustices in the collective bargaining process.
The employee who benefits from the union negotiations, while con-
tributing none of the organizational effort nor incurring the detrimen-
tal aspects of the strike, ' is a "free rider" to the extent that he
contributes no organizational assistance to the union cause.
The potential undermining of unions as the bargaining agent for
the employees as a result of the Hershey decision appears to outweigh
its promotion of individual rights. The ultimate -effectiveness of the
union depends upon its cohesiveness and ability to maintain a
strike."' The power to present a "united front" through discipline of
union members who ignore the union mandate is essential to the
union's ability to strike and to bargain effectively. The Hershey deci-
sion subverts the union's power to compel unified employee demands
and action by allowing employees to evade union discipline and elude
their duties by refraining from participation in union membership. As
the number of employees electing to refrain from membership in-
",3 Many agreements provide individual workers with the right to negotiate bene-
fits beyond those provided for generally. 2 BNA COL. BARG. NEG. & CONT. 93-201. For
the purposes of this discussion it is assumed that no such provision is applicable.
" See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
" The Court in J. L Case Co. v. NLRB stated: "We are not called upon to say
that under no circumstances can an individual enforce an agreement more advanta-
geous than [the] collective agreement [provided] . . . " 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944).
11 See note 92 supra.
117 See generally Dakom, Individual vs. Collective Agreements: A Study in Con-
flict and Union Leverage, 42 FORD. L. REV. 495 (1974).
"' An employee who cannot be forced to honor picket lines during a strike will be
able to benefit from the more advantageous contract provisions gained through the use
of the strike without losing any pay as a result of not working during the strike.
I Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 483, 488
(1950). See note 95 supra.
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creases,' the strike threat, and consequently the union's effective-
ness as bargaining representative, diminishes.
Although the Ninth Circuit's resolution of the Hershey case is
consistent with the Taft-Hartley Act's design to insulate employment
rights from organizational duties while prohibiting the "free rider,"''
the court failed to confront problems involving the "organizational
free rider"-the individual who satisifies the financial obligations of
the union but fails to meet the further organizational responsibilities
necessary to successful unionism. The decision does enable each em-
ployee to base his decision concerning union membership on individ-
ual desires rather than on contractual compulsion. Eventually, how-
ever, workers generally could suffer as a result of a weakened union
solidarity. As unity deteriorates and management loses respect for
the union as a bargaining agent the collective agreement will provide
less satisfactory benefits for employees. Just as the "organizational
free rider" reaps the benefits provided by the efforts of the active
membership, union members will bear the detriment of decreased
union efficiency created by the "organizational free rider." Conse-
quently, the repercussions of Hershey extend beyond the individual
to the institution.
KEVIN RIELLEY
"2 The number of employees who will seek to avoid the responsibilities of union
membership by declining actual membership in the union and merely tendering an
amount equal to dues is purely speculative. States which have adopted right-to-work
laws, outlawing compulsory union membership, offer a means of assessing the possible
ramifications of the Hershey decision on union growth and power. Evidence available
from one such state, Texas, indicates that overall union growth in manufacturing
industries has shown no significant decline since passage of the right-to-work law.
Industries that had traditionally depended on compulsory membership agreements,
i.e., construction and maritime industries, did experience difficulties in recruitment.
Meyers, Effects of "Right-to-Work" Laws: A Study of the Texas Act, 9 IND. & LAB.
REL. REV. 77, 78 (1955). See generally' Warshal, "Right-to-Work," Pro and Con, 17
LAB. L.J. 131 (1966); McDermott, Union Security and Right-to-Work Laws, 16 LAB.
L.J. 667 (1965).
I2 The union must be selected by a majority of the employees in a given bargain-
ing unit. Upon the petition of 30% of the members of the bargaining unit the NLRB
can order an election to redetermine the existence of majority support for the union.
The Act only requires that a majority of the bargaining unit accept the union as
exclusive bargaining agent, not that a majority be members of the union. Therefore, a
union could still be exclusive bargaining representative and be able to compel less than
a majority of the employees to take part in an economic strike. 29 U.S.C. 1 § 159(E)
(1970). See text accompanying note 76 supra.
